Hi all, I'm working on an early modern text, and I'm stuck with the last line of the following passage: Parum certe mihi videntur mathematice agere illasque imitari disciplinas, in quibus nihil non definitur, omnia cohaerent, quaeque solae scientiae antiquitus et apud Aristotelem nomen methodi meruere, a quibus omnes aliae scientiae methodum, si quam habent perfectam, mutuarunt, et per analogiam ad has obiecti sui species principia et passiones suis nectunt ordinibus. Hinc est, quod universa Aristotelis philosophia tot geometricis scateat exemplis, ubi aliquid difficile et quavis alia via inexplicabile sese offerebat: sed et philosophus partem illam, quae est de dissertricis scientiae obiecto principali (de quo invento plus gloriatur quam de reliquis), ex hisce disciplinis videtur excerpsisse, adeo ut logica, quatenus est instrumentum sciendi, matheseos legitimus partus dici debeat; For this I have: It certainly seems to me the same thing to proceed mathematically and to imitate those disciplines, in which nothing is not defined, everything coheres, and which were the only sciences, in ancient times and according to Aristotle, to deserve the name of method, from which all other sciences, if they have any perfection, borrowed their method, and by proportions, bind in their orderings the principles and results to the appearances of their object. Thus it is that Aristotle’s whole philosophy swarms with geometrical examples, wherever something difficult and by any other way inexplicable offered itself. But the philosopher is also seen to have extracted from these disciplines that part which belongs to the principle object of the expounders of the sciences ([and] of which discovery he boasts more than of the others), to such an extant that logic, insofar as it is an instrument of knowing, ought to be called the legitimate offspring of mathematics. But the last line (adeo ut logica, quatenus est instrumentum sciendi, matheseos legitimus partus dici debeat is bothering me. I've rendered this as "logic ... ought to be called the legitimate offspring of mathematics." But why, then, is "matheosos" in the accusative? Should this instead be "It ought to be said that mathematics is the legitimate offspring of logic ..." (reading "matheosos" as the subject of a dropped "esse")? Or is there another option I'm missing? Thanks for your help!