Honesta enim bonis viris, non occulta quaeruntur.
Good men seek not secrecy, but what is right.
—Cicero, De Officiis, iii, 8.9
Cicero teaches a lesson about ethical action here by recounting Plato's retelling of the myth of Gyges in The Republic: how Gyges used a ring that granted him invisibility to hide his evil deeds of seduction, murder, and the usurpation of the throne of Lydia. Glaucon argues in The Republic that men only do right to be seen as good, that morality is merely a social construct, and that any man would do evil if he could be certain that it could be done in perfect secrecy. Eventually, Socrates counters that a man who is not a slave to his passions and chooses to do the right even in secret remains in control of himself, and is therefore happy. The related Roman concept of virtus, that ethical choices are a matter of strength of will against the passions, is what probably lies behind Cicero's use of this example.
In our own culture today, many powerful and respected men secretly yield to their passions for power, wealth, and success by evil deeds they believe will remain in secret. The trouble with that is that secrets will out, and their true natures will eventually be revealed.
Do we do right only to seem just, or do we do it out of a true commitment to justice, even when justice may be opposed to our own interests?
Good men seek not secrecy, but what is right.
—Cicero, De Officiis, iii, 8.9
Cicero teaches a lesson about ethical action here by recounting Plato's retelling of the myth of Gyges in The Republic: how Gyges used a ring that granted him invisibility to hide his evil deeds of seduction, murder, and the usurpation of the throne of Lydia. Glaucon argues in The Republic that men only do right to be seen as good, that morality is merely a social construct, and that any man would do evil if he could be certain that it could be done in perfect secrecy. Eventually, Socrates counters that a man who is not a slave to his passions and chooses to do the right even in secret remains in control of himself, and is therefore happy. The related Roman concept of virtus, that ethical choices are a matter of strength of will against the passions, is what probably lies behind Cicero's use of this example.
In our own culture today, many powerful and respected men secretly yield to their passions for power, wealth, and success by evil deeds they believe will remain in secret. The trouble with that is that secrets will out, and their true natures will eventually be revealed.
Do we do right only to seem just, or do we do it out of a true commitment to justice, even when justice may be opposed to our own interests?